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Abstract 
The high degree of sustainable nominal convergence between EMU 
member states have not implied a corresponding degree of real and struc-
tural convergence. Still existing structural asymmetries in the monetary un-
ion, which is not an Optimum Currency Area, are bound to broaden due to 
continuous enlargement of Europe, giving rise to various kinds of shocks and 
divergences, poor economic performance in some member countries and to 
Europe as a whole. This paper examines the potential sources of asymme-
tries, which to a large extend determine the exposure to asymmetric shocks, 
or asymmetrical effects stemming from symmetric shocks. We also analyze 
available adjustment mechanisms and appropriate policy instruments in 
EMU’s economic reality. Using a set of economic indicators we investigate 
how some product and labor market rigidities affect in an adverse way mac-
roeconomic performance in EMU. Having restricted the fiscal room for ma-
neuver under the Stability and Growth Pact, existing asymmetries and struc-
tural rigidities call for a speed-up of structural reforms, as the only way to 
growth and prosperity. 
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1. Introduction 
The EMU’s policy and institutional frameworks have been designed to 
foster macroeconomic stability, with price stability been a key intermediate 
target. Having defined a set of six nominal convergence criteria for joining 
the EMU, the economies of the euro area today appear to have achieved a 
reasonable degree of nominal convergence.  
Prior to the launch of the euro, many economists argued that EMU was 
not an optimum currency area and, because of this, lacked the appropriate 
adjustment instruments to tackle shocks. In a heterogeneous EMU some 
member states are bound to be hit asymmetrically. Although the worst fears 
about euro area’s capacity to adjust to shocks have not been justified, euro 
appears to have not improved EMU’s countries’ capacity to recover quickly 
from economic downturns. On a similar note and despite these achievements, 
growth performance in the euro area has been disappointing so far, especially 
in contrast with the rest of the world.  Diverging macroeconomic perform-
ance has been observed even within EMU, as some indicators suggest, 
probably due to divergent efforts to undertake necessary structural reforms, 
which also may deepen structural divergence, especially between core and 
peripheral countries.   
There is a comprehensive literature using a variety of econometric mod-
els and techniques aiming at estimating the extent of asymmetries in trans-
mission mechanisms for monetary policy and their consequences for output 
and employment or other macroeconomic aggregates. However, in this paper 
we explore possible sources of asymmetries, how they link to various kinds 
of shocks and which factors determine shock exposure and adjustment capa-
bility in EMU countries. Using appropriate indicators, we illustrate correla-
tions between these features and show how they connect to countries’ mac-
roeconomic performance.  
Obviously, structural asymmetries require country specific structural re-
forms. Although there is a consensus about the need for reforms at a Euro-
pean level, national policy makers have not been able to fully implement 
such reforms, as stated in the so called Lisbon strategy. Postponing the im-
plementation of such structural measures, a country’s adjustment capacity to 
shocks is delayed and so does its own and Europe’s capability to raise poten-
tial output.  
2. The nature of shocks 
The most important feature in economic and monetary union (EMU) is 
the loss of the nominal exchange rate as a policy instrument. In a fast-
changing economic environment, with speedy market integration, increasing 
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factor mobility, fluctuations in economic activity, no matter the cause of 
them, the loss of this instrument has serious implications for countries’ long 
term macroeconomic stability and welfare.  
As the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) (Mundell R. 1961) 
suggests, labour mobility and market flexibility become the main adjustment 
mechanism to tackle shocks in a monetary union, replacing to some extend 
traditional monetary policy instruments.   
If shocks are differential or asymmetric, they may require different mac-
roeconomic policy response across EMU countries and alternative means of 
tackling them. Hence, in the context of EMU, it becomes of central impor-
tance to reduce the exposure of a member country to shocks with preventive 
policies, such as greater nominal flexibility and labor mobility, as well as to 
reinforce traditional stabilization instruments, such as regional and fiscal 
policies, which of course calls for sound public finances. Otherwise, sym-
metric as well as asymmetric shocks may be costly for countries participating 
in EMU and, without appropriate structural policies, all shocks become 
asymmetric (Mundell 2002). Factors such as country size, economic struc-
ture, behavior of economic agents and social partners’ preferences, lie behind 
asymmetries, or, symmetric shocks with asymmetric effects. For these rea-
sons all shocks, both symmetric and asymmetric, are potentially problematic 
and require appropriate adjustment mechanisms (Buti M. and Sapir A. 2002).  
Shocks may are usually defined as any unanticipated event, which has a 
direct or indirect impact on endogenous variables such as output, inflation, 
employment of the reference system without however being part of them 
(European economy N.44 1990). On this basis, a traditional classification of 
shocks in the economic literature is common or symmetric, versus country 
specific or asymmetric. Common or symmetric shocks have a simultaneous 
and direct impact on all member countries of the EMU, while country spe-
cific, local, or asymmetric shocks have an impact on only one country or re-
gion. Both these categories of shocks can affect the demand or the supply 
side of an economy, which explains another distinction, the demand and sup-
ply side shocks.  
Buti M. and Sapir A. (2002) describe the Asian crisis 1998-99 and the 
global slowdown 2001-2002 as examples of a typical negative symmetric 
demand side shock, while the oil price hike in 2000 was a negative supply 
side shock. These demand and supply shocks, although symmetrical in ori-
gin, had asymmetrical consequences and reactions in different European 
countries, due to different economic structures, economic behavior or prefer-
ences.  
Another distinction is policy-induced shocks versus exogenous shocks. 
Policy shocks are obviously asymmetric, generated by domestic fiscal or 
monetary policy reactions. There is widespread evidence that ideological 
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preferences and political considerations influence governments’ macroeco-
nomic policies, implying a variety of responses to common shocks. By such 
behavior, they tend to induce endogenous asymmetric shocks, prior or after 
elections, which again generate divergent political business cycles (Sardelis 
C.1994; Buti M. and Sapir A. 2002).  
As a positive policy-induced EMU’s shock for peripheral countries can 
be considered the significant reduction in interest rates experienced when 
European Central Bank (ECB) assumed responsibility for the common 
monetary policy. (European Economy No.1 2004). Also changes in behav-
iors of economic agents (households, firms, social partners) can create by the 
same way asymmetric shocks.  
Finally, another important distinction is between temporary and perma-
nent shocks, with several implications when analyzing adaptability and ap-
propriate policy response. Stabilization policy may be called in the case of 
temporary shocks, while policies for structural adjustment are imperative as a 
response to permanent shocks.  
3. Structural Asymmetries and Exposure to shocks 
As already mentioned, different economic structures, lack of synchroni-
zation in economic cycles and limited adjustment capacity due to rigid labor 
markets, low cross-border labor mobility and the absence of a central fiscal 
authority may impose asymmetric costs that might outweigh the benefits of 
the EMU. (European Economy No.1 2004). As the OCA theory suggests, an 
independent monetary policy with a flexible exchange rate work as substi-
tutes for flexible markets only in the case of temporary shocks. But it is not a 
solution and appropriate policy to long-term real rigidities in the case of 
permanent shocks. Since these two above tools no longer exist, either for 
short or long-term policies in the euro area, governments should have greater 
incentives to strengthen and to pursuit structural reforms in order to improve 
the economy’s adaptability to shocks, (temporary and permanent) and to 
strengthen its growth potential. This can be considered as a one-way policy 
in the context of EMU.  
Usually referred in the literature factors which give rise to asymmetries 
or structural differences across EMU countries are:  
• Differences in economic structure are an important source of 
asymmetry, as it may cause national economies to react differ-
ently to a common shock. Lack of diversification in production 
for the domestic or the export markets, the presence of domestic 
oil, natural gas or other energy production, as well as the degree 
of dependence on oil imports, specialization in specific sectors 
may be causes of asymmetries and sector specific shocks. Eco-
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nomic structures and integrated product markets characterized 
by inter-industry specialization implies that, common shocks 
will asymmetrically affect the countries in which the various in-
dustries are located (European Economy No. 44 1990). On the 
other hand, with more similar economic structures, dominated 
by intra-industry specialization, the effects of common shocks 
become more symmetric. As under EMU integration proceeds 
and trade linkages between participating countries increases the 
exposure and likelihood of asymmetric shocks can be reduced. 
(Buti A. and Sapir A. 2002).  
• On the other hand, in a European market characterized by in-
creasing returns to scale, knowledge spillovers, geographical 
concentration of industries and greater specialization, opposite 
tendencies may be developed.  
• Related to differences in economic structures are differences in 
structures of exports and imports among EMU countries. A 
common euro exchange rate affects euro area countries asym-
metrically. An appreciation of the euro will most likely have op-
posite effects on economic activity between countries with posi-
tive and negative contribution of net exports to growth. Coun-
tries with a large exporting sector will be hit by a negative 
shock, whereas countries with large trade deficits vis-à-vis coun-
tries outside the Euro area will benefit, as domestic prices tend 
to decline, boosting both GDP and real income.   (Suardi M. 
2002). 
• Differences in the degree of labor market flexibility, especially 
wage flexibility and labor mobility, geographical as well as oc-
cupational. The elimination of labor market rigidities and the 
higher degree of labor market flexibility have an important role 
to play in helping EMU countries to absorb shocks. (De Grauwe 
2000). 
• There is evidence that tax and benefit systems, employment pro-
tection legislation, minimum wages and unemployment insur-
ance systems, active labor market policies, which may help or 
hinder labor mobility and the type of the wage formation proc-
ess, differ to a large extent across European countries. They in-
fluence the degree of labor market and wage flexibility, espe-
cially as the wage determination process, if it is centralized or 
decentralized, along with differences in labor market institu-
tions, determine rigidities and the shock absorbing capacity in 
each country, which help to explain existing differences in un-
employment rates (Blanchard O. and Wolfers J. 2000). 
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• Inflation differentials between member states are explained by 
factors such as: price shocks due to differences in member states 
consumption patterns, market imperfections and exposure to ex-
tra euro area cyclical fluctuations, which continue to persist be-
tween member states. Also, policy-induced price changes due to 
uncoordinated decisions about indirect taxes, administrative 
prices, and the pace of deregulation, may also constitute sources 
of inflation diversity. (European Economy No 1. 2004). 
• Monetary policy transmission mechanisms may differ as well 
among member states, for several reasons. For instance, differ-
ences in level of leverage of the private sector, the composition 
of loans in fixed and floating rates as well as the competitive 
conditions in the financial sector, are factors that may induce di-
verging responses to changes in the ECB fund rate. Such differ-
ences in financial structures are a likely a result of divergent le-
gal structures among member states, which have to be harmo-
nized (Cecchetti S. 1999), since this has been recognized as an 
important source of heterogeneity and a crucial policy issue in 
the functioning of the EMU. (Hughes Hallett A. 2002). 
• Financial market integration by creating a common regulatory 
framework constitutes a Lisbon target. The integration of frag-
mented national systems is going to have positive impacts on ef-
ficiency, competition and stability (European Economy No 1. 
2004). 
• Differences in stabilization capability of fiscal policy defined by 
the room of maneuver for budgetary policy, determined by the 
combination of public deficit and debt in the event of a cyclical 
downturn. (Buti M. and Sapir A. 2002) 
• Differences in behavior of economic agents (European Economy 
No 44 1990). Asymmetric behaviour in wage setting and reac-
tion patterns to a common exogenous event may give rise either 
to endogenous asymmetric shocks or to asymmetric reactions to 
a common exogenous disturbance. It follows that a more ho-
mogenous economic behavior is to be expected, as multilateral 
policy surveillance may gradually foster greater homogeneity. 
(Buti M. and Sapir A. 2002) 
• Different consumer or political preferences along with differ-
ences in the regulatory framework are also an issue, which 
should be addressed in order to bring about not only a harmo-
nized economic and regulatory environment, but also a common 
macroeconomic stability culture.  
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4. Adjustment capability to shocks 
Every EMU country has to develop its own appropriate adjustment 
mechanism and capacity to respond to shocks stemming from the above de-
scribed asymmetries. The nature of a shock determines a fundamental dis-
tinction in policy response and a basic rule derived from common sense 
should be to treat temporary shocks with available counter-cyclical measures 
and permanent shocks by reforming the underlying structure and the func-
tioning of the economy.  
Despite continuous convergence and harmonization efforts intensified af-
ter participation in the EMU, sizable differences remain with regard to both 
stabilization and structural adjustment capability among EMU countries. 
Given the loss of monetary and exchange rate instruments for individual 
countries, fiscal policy and structural policies are the remaining instruments 
to tackle problems arising from various types of economic shocks, symmetric 
or asymmetric, demand or supply, temporary or permanent.  
Fiscal policy in EMU remains decentralized with certain constraints and 
falls under the responsibility of member states, with adequate mix of auton-
omy, discipline and coordination. Fiscal discipline and flexibility are the 
main complementary principles governing budgetary policy in EMU. Flexi-
bility is required to deal with country-specific shocks and discipline to safe-
guard the credibility of the single monetary authority (Buti M, Franco D, 
Ongena  H. 1998). Fiscal stabilization capability depends on the size and 
effectiveness of automatic stabilizers and the room for maneuver of fiscal 
authorities. The degree of smoothing cyclical fluctuations provided by auto-
matic stabilizers varies significantly under various types of shocks and across 
countries. (Buti M. and Sapir A. 2002). 
The efficacy of stabilization policies is higher in the case of shocks to 
private consumption and weaker in the cases of investment and export de-
mand shocks. It is much more effective in countries with large automatic 
stabilizers, as in the northern European countries, but less effective in the 
European south, where the size of automatic stabilizers is smaller. The other 
dimension of a country’s fiscal stabilization capability, the room for maneu-
ver, depends on both the deficit and the outstanding public debt, in order to 
meet the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pacts (SGP). Violations of 
the SGP requirements in terms of high deficit and debt, severely curtail the 
room for maneuver for fiscal policy and, as a consequence, its capability to 
stabilize an economy afflicted by a symmetric or an asymmetric shock.  
Parallel to country specific fiscal adjustment capabilities, EU structural 
funds constitute a complementary instrument, designed to tackle intra- Euro-
pean regional disparities and to shield regions from negative real shocks, part 
of which may be attributed to the overall restructuring of the European 
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Economy, especially after the introduction of the EMU. Despite the low de-
gree of federal financing, relative to other federations, the structural funds in 
general support and improve the adjustment capacity of regions and enhance 
EU’s shock-absorbing capabilities, under strict conditionalities in order to 
avoid problems of moral hazard and inefficient use of transfers (European 
economy No 44 1990). 
Under these conditions and constraints of fiscal policies, the develop-
ment of adjustment capability to cope with temporary and, particularly, per-
manent shocks, relies almost exclusively on the ability and the speed to im-
plement structural reforms. Structural problems must be tackled only by 
structural reforms either inside or outside of EMU.  
A structural reform strategy is an integral part, along with fiscal policies, 
of a national strategy to maximize the net benefits of a participation in a 
monetary union. An appropriate national strategy in the context of EMU re-
quires state flexibility and asymmetric responses to confront with EMU 
asymmetries, exercised in a more indirect manner. (Pagoulatos G. and Pela-
gidis T. 2004). Appropriate reforms with a view to increase flexibility and 
efficiency in labor and product markets, a country promotes its long term 
protection against external shocks. EMU is likely to strengthen the political 
incentives and increase pressure for labor-marker reform to reduce structural 
(equilibrium) unemployment. A such well-designed reform could involve all 
related policy measures and instruments, for example, duration of unem-
ployment benefits, substitution of individual for collective wage agreements, 
minimum wages, legal framework for wage setting, employment protection 
taxes etc. (Calmfors L. 1998). We have to ask which labor market structure 
could provide the role of economic stabilizer using nominal wage (Hughes 
Hallett A. and Viegi N. 2001). 
As the common currency is expected to induce a large scale relocation of 
production at a European level, countries with more business-friendly regula-
tory environment will most likely attract more investment those with rigid 
and obsolete approaches to entrepreneurship and will benefit more than oth-
ers from EMU participation. To reduce the administrative burden is another 
economic imperative in a monetary union, probably prompting an EU-wide 
regulatory competition.  
Moreover, the realization of structural reform program and strategy, the 
most important tool for adjustment capability to shocks, requires the active 
role of the state in the field of collective action through synergies with social 
partners, to be a coordinator, a mediator, a partner and facilitator. (Pagulatos 
G. and Pelagidis T. 2004). 
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5. Measuring exposure to shocks 
In EMU countries where convergence criteria were defined in nominal 
terms and for one particular moment of time, this implies nothing about con-
vergence in structures and patterns of responses, or the ability to sustainable 
convergence.  If significant differences remain in structure or in the re-
sponses to policy changes or external shocks, then it is inevitable to have 
different impacts in different places, which may at least delay real conver-
gence or drive Union’s economies apart.(Hughes Hallett A. and Piscielli L. 
1999). Using different models, there have been many attempts to estimate 
and quantify the impacts and costs imposed by asymmetric shocks under 
EMU (e.g. Dornbusch et al. 1998, Driver R. and Wren-Lewis S. 1999, 
Hughes Hallett A. and Piscielli L. 1999, Wyplosz Ch. 1989).  
Having described above the divergences in economic structures and 
sources of asymmetries, we will now focus on the use of indicators which 
measure the degree of exposure and the adjustment capability to shocks. 
Such a list of indicators could be an operational and useful instrument for 
policy measures and give useful guidance to design structural reforms.  
Using OECD indicators of product and labor markets regulations, we can 
rank European countries in terms of their regulatory impediments to smooth 
market functioning, along with their exposure and their adjustment capability 
to shocks (Buti M. and Sapir A. 2002). The OECD indicators of product 
market regulation (PMR indicator) presented in table 1, are constituted of 16 
low – level indicators grouping in three main categories, namely state con-
trol, barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to trade and investment. The 
indicators of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) illustrate the strict-
ness of this legislation and the degree of malfunctioning of labor markets 
created by rigid job-security provisions. Such provisions reduce the adapta-
bility of labor market, inhibit competition, liberalization and necessary flexi-
bility under EMU regime (Conway P. et al. OECD 2005). Although EPL is a 
very important aspect, it is only a part of a wide range of interventions in the 
labor market. Adding the two indicators we construct a synthetic total indica-
tor showing the market’s functioning. Where restrictive regulatory environ-
ment in the product market tends to be associated with restrictive employ-
ment protection policies, there seems to be a high degree of correlation be-
tween the two regulatory regimes (Nicoletti G. et al 2000).  
By using the combination of general government deficit and outstanding 
debt position, we can show the room for maneuver of fiscal policy and it’s 
stabilization capability particularly in the case of temporary shocks. Coun-
tries with low deficits and debt have greater room for maneuver to adopt ap-
propriate discretionary policies to handle shocks, and are less exposed to 
them.  
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As shown in table 1, European countries and also euro area countries differ a 
great deal with respect to exposure to shocks and the ability of their labor and 
product markets to cushion shocks. Consistent with the pattern of conver-
gence, countries can be grouped in three categories: The “relative restric-
tive”, the “relative liberal”, and the “middle of the road” countries.  
In some cases European countries, by implementing policy reforms, re-
corded a substantial improvement in the overall product and labor market 
regulation, between 1998 and 2003. Despite of this progress, the divergence 
between euro area and the U.S.A. has been broadened under this period of 
time.  
Also, a high degree of correlation exists between the relative rigidity of 
product and labor market regimes, or a positive relationship between product 
and labor markets reforms, with the former preceding the latter, that means a 
positive relationship between employment protection legislation and product 
market regulation. As observed, since 1998 restrictive product market regula-
tion tends to be matched by analogous employment protection legislation 
restrictions (Conway P. et all OECD 2005).  
Protecting “insiders” by means of restrictive EPL and also because of the 
product market liberalization, reduces the rents accruing to firms, there is 
less incentive for labor to maintain or increase bargaining power aimed at 
capturing part of these rents, are some explanations to this correlation 
(Blanchard O. and Giavazzi F. 2003). 
Similarities in countries performance of exposure and adjustment capa-
bility can be observed by deficit and debt position data, showing the room for 
maneuver of fiscal policy. Countries with rigid product and labor markets 
seem to have also limited fiscal room for maneuver, under Stability’s and 
Growth Pact framework. 
This fact reflects structural problems and rigidities in their public sector 
for this period of time. The delayed structural reforms, in the functioning of 
both private and public sector, make them vulnerable to shocks and the ex-
perience of asymmetric shocks but also asymmetric effects from symmetric 
shocks.     
6. Identifying shocks 
In EMU where widespread asymmetries exist, and where asymmetric 
shocks or symmetric shocks with asymmetric effects occur, we observe di-
verging implications and costs across European countries. Differences in 
exposure and adjustment capabilities to shocks seem to link to deteriorating 
performance, as reflected in a range of macroeconomic performance indica-
tors, such as GDP growth, unemployment and inflation.  Using Euroarea av-
erages as a benchmark for performance comparisons, we estimate relative 
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performance deviations from this benchmark for each one of the countries, a 
usual way of identifying shocks (Wyplosz C. 2006).  
Thus, asymmetrical inflation shocks are identified when deviations from 
Euroarea harmonized CPI-index differ significantly in two successive 5-year 
periods. Similarly, asymmetrical domestic demand and supply shocks can be 
approximated by the differentials in the growth of retail sales, volume indi-
ces, and industrial production indices. Identification of asymmetric shocks in 
fiscal policy, real wages, unemployment, trade balance and other variables 
can be derived in a similar way (Weber A. 1991) as the aggregate economic 
system is subject to all above mentioned kinds of shocks.  
If such shocks are temporary, some of them usually bombard the econ-
omy a certain period, in contrast with permanent, which have persistent ef-
fects. There is of course a serious issue concerning a government’s capability 
to make the right diagnosis about the origin, the nature and the duration of 
the shock, quickly enough to respond during the current period, with appro-
priate policy measures (Begg D. 1991). In the table 2, we use four indicators 
of macroeconomic performance: GDP growth, inflation, unemployment, and 
current account balance. For each country of the fifteen European countries, 
table 2 presents the differences for each indicator between the country in 
question and the Euro Area average, respectively.  
This is done over two periods, the pre-euro years 1996-2000 (conver-
gence period) and the post EMU period, 2001- 2005. Significant deviations 
from Euro area averages help us to identify the occurrence of shock for each 
country and variable.  
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According to table 2, Greece seems to be the only country in the sample 
which has experienced asymmetric shocks in all four indicators, favorable 
ones concerning growth and inflation and unfavorable for unemployment 
and, especially, current account balance. Current account shocks of such di-
mensions certainly reflect severe loss of competitiveness. The same shock is 
also important in the case of Spain and Italy, while remains very high with 
little deterioration in the case of Portugal. 
Spain, Italy and Ireland have also experienced positive unemployment 
shocks. We also observe differences and changes between the two periods 
for other countries, although not significant, a fact that confirms the absence 
of serious asymmetric shocks.  
7. Conclusions 
According to OCA theory, the occurrence of many shocks and of various 
types can be taken as a sign that EMU is not an optimal currency area and 
that nominal convergence is not sufficient to secure a real one and a smooth 
functioning of the EMU. It also indicates the existence of risks for future 
welfare in certain member countries. As explained in section 3, existing 
structural diversities in a number of economic aspects form a highly hetero-
geneous EMU. It is broadly accepted from the establishment of the EMU that 
these asymmetries can impose costs and have destabilizing consequences for 
some of the participating countries.  
The enlarged Europe of twenty seven countries, most of them highly het-
erogeneous in economic terms, may enhance existing asymmetries and 
probably multiply potential sources of asymmetric shocks. 
Because monetary policy could not deal with diverging implications of 
asymmetric shocks, alternative appropriate adjustment mechanisms and ca-
pabilities should be designed and used, in order to tackle the problems aris-
ing from a country’s participation in the EMU.  
Since the scope for discretionary and uncoordinated fiscal policies is lim-
ited under SGP and structural funds have only a marginal and a complemen-
tary role to play in supporting regional policies, the most important remain-
ing tool is structural policies. The implementation of well designed structural 
reforms constitute the most efficient adjustment mechanism, able to increase 
the flexibility of national economy and  safeguard long-term competitiveness 
and growth potential. 
Aiming to speed up the implementation of structural reforms, European 
Union (EU) adopted the Lisbon strategy as a high priority. Despite a long 
process of economic integration, EU countries differ considerably in their 
economic structures, in their efforts, preferences and pace of implementing 
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structural reforms, as well as in establishing a homogeneous regulatory envi-
ronment.  
As we observed in table 1 and table 2, in some countries, structural ri-
gidities exist both in product and labor markets, implying increased vulner-
ability to real shocks, coupled with long-term welfare losses. As economic 
theory suggests, reforms would be less effective if they take place only in 
one market, implying that they have to be implemented simultaneously in 
both markets. It has also been observed that, in certain countries, the above 
mentioned drawbacks coexist with limited room for maneuver for fiscal poli-
cies and this combination enhances their vulnerability to exogenous shocks.  
As to the near future, an acceleration of structural reform, a more homo-
geneous economic behavior and the promotion of a macroeconomic stability 
culture, are likely to evolve due to multilateral policy surveillance. Such 
policies promote their adaptability by reducing the exposure to and the ef-
fects of, asymmetric shocks. 
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